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The usual reading of logical implication A→ B as “ if A then B ” fails in intuitionistic logic: there are
formulas A and B such that A→ B is not provable, even though B is provable whenever A is provable.
Intuitionistic rules apparently don’t capture interesting meta-properties of the logic and, from a com-
putational perspective, the programs corresponding to intuitionistic proofs are not powerful enough.
Such non-provable implications are nevertheless admissible, and we study their behaviour by means
of a proof term assignment and related rules of reduction. We introduce V, a calculus that is able to
represent admissible inferences, while remaining in the intuitionistic world by having normal forms
that are just intuitionistic terms. We then extend intuitionistic logic with principles corresponding to
admissible rules. As an example, we consider the Kreisel-Putnam logic KP, for which we prove the
strong normalization and the disjunction property through our term assignment. This is our first step
in understanding the essence of admissible rules for intuitionistic logic.
1 Introduction
Proof systems are usually presented inductively by giving axioms and rules of inference, which are
respectively the ingredients and the tools for cooking new proofs. For example, when presenting classical
propositional logic (CPC) in natural deduction, for each of the usual connectives ∧,∨,¬,→,⊥ one gives
a set of standard tools to introduce or remove a connective from a formula in order to obtain a proof.
In their most essential form, we can represent rules as an inference A1, ...,An/B (read “from A1, ...,An
infer B”) where A1, . . . ,An,B are schemata of logic formulas. A rule A1, . . . ,An/B is said to be admissible
in a proof system if it is in a way redundant, i.e. whenever A1 . . .An are provable, then B is already
provable without using that rule. Adding or dropping rules may increase or decrease the amount of proofs
we can cook in a proof system. The effect can be dramatic: for example, classical propositional logic
CPC can be obtained by simply adding the rule of double negation elimination (¬¬A/A) to intuitionistic
propositional logic IPC. Admissible rules are all the opposite: if we decide to utilize one in order to cook
something, then we could have just used our ingredients in a different way to reach the same result.
One appealing feature of CPC is the fact that it is structurally complete: all its admissible rules are
derivable, in the sense that whenever A1, . . . ,An/B is an admissible rule, then also the corresponding
principle A1∧ ·· · ∧An→ B is provable [4] – i.e. the system acknowledges that there’s no need for that
additional tool, so we can internalize it and use the old tools to complete our reasoning. This is not the
case in intuitionistic logic: the mere fact that we know that the tool was not needed, doesn’t give us any
way to show inside the system why is that. On the other hand, IPC has other wonderful features. Relevant
here is the disjunction property, fundamental for a constructive system: when a disjunction A∨B is
provable, then one of the disjuncts A or B is provable as well. Our interest is in these intuitionistic
admissible rules that are not derivable, in the computational principles they describe, and in the logic
systems obtained by explicitly adding such rules to IPC.
A. Condoluci & M. Manighetti 11
Can one effectively identify all intuitionistic admissible rules? The question of whether that set of
rules is recursively enumerable was posed by Friedman in 1975, and answered positively by Rybakov in
1984. It was then de Jongh and Visser who exhibited a numerable set of rules (now known as Visser’s
rules) and conjectured that it formed a basis for all the admissible rules of IPC. This conjecture was later
proved by Iemhoff in the fundamental [6]. Rozie`re in his Ph.D. thesis [9] reached the same conclusion
with a substantially different technique, independently of Visser and Iemhoff. These works elegantly
settled the problem of identifying and building admissible rules. However our question is different: why
are these rules superfluous, and what reduction steps can eliminate them from proofs?
Rozie`re first posed the question of finding a computational correspondence for his basis of the ad-
missible rules in the conclusion of his thesis, but no work has been done on this ever since. Natural
deduction provides a powerful tool to analyse the computational behaviour of logical axioms, thanks to
the fact that it gives a simple way to translate axioms into rules and to develop correspondences with
λ -calculi. Our plan is therefore to understand the phenomenon of admissibility by equipping proofs with
λ -terms and associated reductions in the spirit of the Curry-Howard correspondence. Normalization will
show explicitly what role admissible rules play in a proof.
1.1 Visser’s Basis
The central role in the developement of the paper is played by Visser’s basis of rules. The term basis
means that any rule that is admissible for IPC is obtainable by combining some of the rules of the family
with other intuitionistic reasoning. It consists of the following sequence of rules:
Vissern : (Bi→Ci)i=1...n→ A1∨A2 /

∨n
j=1((Bi→Ci)i=1...n→ B j)
∨
((Bi→Ci)i=1...n→ A1)
∨
((Bi→Ci)i=1...n→ A2)
This is read as: for every natural number n, whenever the left part of the rule (a n-ary implication)
is provable, then the right part (an n+ 2-ary disjunction) is provable. It forms a basis in the sense that
all other admissible rules of IPC can be obtained from the combination of rules from this family with
the usual rules of intuitionistic logic. It is an infinite family, since Vissern+1 cannot be derived from
Visser1,. . . ,Vissern [9].
The importance of Visser’s basis is not limited to intuitionistic logic but also applies more generally
to intermediate logics, as witnessed by the following:
Theorem 1.1 (Iemhoff [7]). If the rules of Visser’s basis are admissible in a logic, then they form a basis
for the admissible rules of that logic
This theorem also gives us a simple argument to prove the structural completeness of CPC: since all
the Vissern rules are provable in CPC, they are admissible and therefore they constitute a basis for all
the admissible rules of CPC; but since the Vissern are derivable, all admissible rules are derivable.
1.2 Contributions and Structure of the Paper
In Section 2 we introduce the natural deduction rules corresponding to Visser’s rules, and present the
associated λ -calculus V: we show that proofs in the new calculus normalize to ordinary intuitionistic
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proofs. In the remaining part of the paper, we push further our idea and start adapting our calculus
to intermediate logics characterized by axioms derived from admissible rules. In Section 3 we study
the well-known Harrop’s rule, and more precisely the logic KP obtained by adding Harrop’s principle to
IPC: we prove good properties like subject reduction, the disjunction property, and strong normalization.
In Section 4 we quickly introduce the logic AD (obtained by adding the axiom V1 to IPC) as a candidate
for future study, and possible extensions to arithmetic. Proofs can be found in the appendices at the end
of the paper.
2 Proof Terms for the Admissible Rules: V
In this section, we are going to assign proof terms to all the inferences of Visser’s basis in a uniform way.
First, we give a natural deduction flavor to the Visser rules. Since the conclusion of the left-hand side of
the rules is a disjunction, we model the rules as generalized disjunction eliminations ∨E ; “generalized”
because the main premise will be the disjunction in the antecedent of the Vissern, but under n implicative
assumptions. Therefore the rules of inference Vissern have the form:
[Bi→Ci]i=1...n
...
A1∨A2
[(Bi→Ci)i=1...n→ A1]
...
D
[(Bi→Ci)i=1...n→ A2]
...
D
[(Bi→Ci)i=1...n→ B j] j=1...n
...
...
D · · · D
D
In order to keep the rules admissible, we need to restrict the usage of the inference: the additional
requirement is that the proofs of the main premise (the one on the left with end-formula A1 ∨A2) must
be closed proofs, i.e. cannot have open assumptions others than the ones discharged by that Visser
inference. Otherwise we would be able to go beyond IPC, since for example we would prove all the
principles corresponding to the admissible rules (as in system AD, see Section 4). On the other side,
it is straightforward to see that our rules directly correspond to rules of Visser’s basis, and that they
adequately represent admissibility. We now turn to proof terms:
t,s,u ::= x,y,z, . . . ∈ V | t s | λx. t
| efq t (exfalso)
| < t,s> (pair)
| proji t (projection)
| inji t (injection)
| case[t || y.s1 | y.s2] (case)
| Vn[~x.t || y.s1 | y.s2 || z.~u] (Visser — in V and AD)
| hop[~x.t || y.s1 | y.s2] (Harrop — in KP)
Figure 1: Proof terms
Since the shape of the rules is the elimination of a disjunction, the proof term associated with this
inference will be modeled on the case analysis case[− ||− |−]. The difference will be in the number
of assumptions that are bound, and in the number of possible cases. We use the vector notation ~x.t on
variables to indicate that a sequence of (indexed) variables x1, . . . ,xn is bound, and on terms like z.~u to
indicate a sequence of (indexed) terms u1, . . . ,un on each of which we are binding the variable z. The
resulting annotation for a Visser inference is then:
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~x : (Bi→Ci)i=1...n ` t : A1∨A2
Γ,y : (Bi→Ci)i=1...n→ A1 ` s1 : D
Γ,y : (Bi→Ci)i=1...n→ A2 ` s2 : D
{Γ,z : (Bi→Ci)i=1...n→ B j ` u j : D} j=1...n
Vissern Γ ` Vn[~x.t || y.s1 | y.s2 || z.~u] : D
We call V the calculus obtained by adding this family of rules of inference to IPC. The syntax of V
can be found in Figure 1, and it includes the usual proof terms for intuitionistic logic [10], plus the proof
terms V−[− ||− |− ||−] for the Visser family.
We now turn to the reduction rules. First of all, we need to define W contexts: intuitively, contexts
are proof terms with a hole, where the hole is denoted by , and E〈t〉 means replacing the unique hole
in the context E with the term t.
Definition 2.1 (Weak head IPC contexts). W contexts are defined by the following grammar:
W ::= |W t | projiW | case[W ||− |−].
Reduction rules for IPC
– Beta (λx. t)s 7→ t{s/x}
– Projection proji< t1, t2> 7→ ti
– Case case[inji t || y.s1 | y.s2] 7→ si{t/y}
Additional rules for V
– Visser-inj Vn[~x.inji t || y.s1 | y.s2 || z.~u] 7→ si{λ~x. t/y} (i = 1,2)
– Visser-efq Vn[~x.W 〈efq t〉 || y.s1 | y.s2 || z.~u] 7→ s1{(λ~x.efq t)/y}
– Visser-app Vn[~x.W 〈x j t〉 || y.s1 | y.s2 || z.~u] 7→ u j{λ~x. t/z} ( j = 1 . . .n)
Figure 2: Reduction rules (V)
The reduction rules for the proof terms are given in Figure 2: the first block defines 7→IPC by means
of the usual rules for IPC, and the second block defines 7→V as 7→IPC plus additional reduction rules
for the new construct Vn[~x.t ′ ||~y.s1 | y.s2 || z.~u], depending on different shapes that t ′ might have.
Let us explain the intuition. In the first case (Visser-inj), the term is the injection inji t with possibly
free variables xi of type Bi → Ci for i = 1 . . .n; in that branch one has chosen to prove one of the two
disjuncts A1 or A2, and we may just reduce to the corresponding proof si, in which we plug the proof t
but after binding the free variables~x. In the second case (Visser-efq), the disjunction is proved by means
of a contradiction, and that contradiction may be used to prove any of the cases s1,s2,~u. In the third case
(Visser-app), the term contains an application with one of the variables bound by the Visser rule on the
left hand side, i.e. the proof uses one of the Visser assumptions to prove the disjunction. We reduce to the
corresponding case u j, where λ~x. t is substituted for the assumption of type (Bi→Ci)i=1...n→ B j. The
reduction relation→V is obtained as usual as the structural closure of the reduction 7→V (and similarly
for→IPC ).
As expected, V–terms normalize: we prove normalization by providing an evaluation function that
reduces V–terms to intuitionistic terms. The idea is to define the evaluator by structural recursion on
typed terms, and using normalization for IPC after each recursive call.
Theorem A.1 (Normalization for V). V enjoys the normalization property.
The following is a consequence of Lemma A.2:
Theorem 2.1. V–terms normalize to IPC–terms.
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3 Beyond IPC: Harrop’s Rule and KP
In the previous section we have been expecially careful in imposing the restriction on the open assump-
tions for the application of our new rules, in order to keep our calculus inside the intuitionistic world and
to obtain precisely a characterization of admissibility. At this point, however, one can legitimately ask:
what happens if we lift such restriction, and allow one or more admissible principles inside an extended
logic? The system of rules we introduced assumes then a different role, that is the role of providing
a simple and modular way to obtain Curry-Howard systems for semi-classical logics arising from the
addition to IPC of axioms corresponding to admissible principles.
The simplest and oldest studied admissible rule of IPC is the rule of independence of premise, also
known as Harrop’s rule in its propositional variant [4]:
¬B→ A1∨A2 /(¬B→ A1)∨ (¬B→ A2)
The logic that arises by adding it to IPC has also been studied, and is known as Kreisel-Putnam logic
(KP). It was introduced by G. Kreisel and H. Putnam [8] to show a logic stronger than IPC that still
could satisfy the disjunction property, thus providing a counterexample to the conjecture of Łukasiewicz
that IPC was the only such logic.
We now proceed to define a Curry-Howard calculus for KP as an instance of the system we presented
in the previous section. It suffices to realize that Harrop’s rule is a particular case of Visser1 where the
formula C is taken to be ⊥ (note that the third disjunct in this instance of Visser1 becomes ¬B→ B, that
implies both the other hypotheses ¬B→ A1 and ¬B→ A2; for this reason we can ignore it). Then we get
the following simplified rule in natural deduction:
[¬B]
...
A1∨A2
[¬B→ A1]
...
D
[¬B→ A2]
...
DHarrop
D
The restriction on the assumptions of the main premise is now gone, and open proofs are allowed. In
fact Harrop’s principle is provable in our system:
[¬B→ A1∨A2](2) [¬B](1)
A1∨A2
[¬B→ A1](1)
(¬B→ A1)∨ (¬B→ A2)
[¬B→ A2](1)
(¬B→ A1)∨ (¬B→ A2)Harrop (1)
(¬B→ A1)∨ (¬B→ A2)
(2)
(¬B→ A1∨A2)→ (¬B→ A1)∨ (¬B→ A2)
The proof term is a simplified version of the proof term for V1, where we remove the term corre-
sponding to the trivialized third disjunct:
Γ,x : ¬B ` t : A1∨A2 Γ,y : ¬B→ A1 ` s1 : D Γ,y : ¬B→ A2 ` s2 : D
Γ ` hop[x.t || y.s1 | y.s2] : D
By inspecting the reduction rules for V, we realize that the rule Visser-app has no counterpart in KP:
since the Harrop assumptions have negated type, their use in proof terms is completely encapsulated in
exfalso terms (see Classification, Lemma B.1 below). Therefore the reduction rules for KP are the ones
for IPC (Figure 2) plus the additional rules Harrop-inj and Harrop-efq in Figure 3. We denote with 7→KP
the toplevel reduction for KP, and with→KP its structural closure.
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– Harrop-inj hop[x.inji t || y.s1 | y.s2] 7→ si{λx. t/y}
– Harrop-efq hop[x.W 〈efq t〉 || y.s1 | y.s2] 7→ s1{(λx.efq t)/y}
Figure 3: Reduction rules (KP)
We prove for KP the usual properties of subject reduction, classification, and strong normalization.
As expected we denote with `KP the provability in KP, but we use simply ` when not ambiguous.
Theorem B.1 (Subject reduction for KP). If Γ `KP t : A and t→KP s, then Γ `KP s : A.
In order to classify normal forms of KP, we need to consider proof terms with possibly open Harrop
assumptions: we denote with Γ¬ a negated typing context, i.e. of the form Γ¬ = {x1 : ¬A1, . . . ,xn : ¬An}.
We obtain the following classification of normal forms:
Lemma B.1 (Classification for KP). Let Γ¬ `KP t : A for t in (weak head) normal form and t not
¬neutral:
• Implication: if A = B→C, then t is an abstraction or a variable in Γ¬;
• Disjunction: if A = B∨C, then t is an injection;
• Conjunction: if A = B∧C, then t is a pair;
• Falsity: if A =⊥, then t = xs for some s and some x ∈ Γ¬.
We prove that KP enjoys the strong normalization property, i.e. all typable terms are strongly nor-
malizing. We use a modified version of the method of reducibility candidates by Girard-Tait [2]. The
differences with respect to the usual proof are that Harrop and exfalso terms are added to neutral terms,
and that the reductions for hop (which involve terms under binders) require special treatment.
Theorem B.2 (Strong normalization of KP). If Γ `KP t : A, then t is strongly normalizing.
The complete proof is on the appendix. We can now prove the disjunction property:
Lemma 3.1 (Consistency). 6`KP t : ⊥ for no t.
Proof. Let us assume that there exists t (which we assume in normal form by Theorem B.2) such that
`KP t : ⊥, and derive a contradiction. We proceed by induction on the size of t. The base case is
impossible because by Lemma B.1 t cannot be a variable. As for the inductive case, by Lemma B.1,
t is either an exfalso, or xu ∈ Γ¬ for some x ∈ Γ¬. In the former case t = efq s for some s such that
`KP s : ⊥, and we use the i.h.; the latter case is not possible, since Γ¬ = /0.
Theorem 3.1 (Disjunction property). If ` A∨B, then ` A or ` B.
Proof. Assume ` t : A∨B for t in normal form by Theorem B.2. First note that t 6= efq s, because
otherwise by inversion ` s : ⊥, contradicting consistency. By Lemma B.1 (with Γ¬ = /0) t is an injection.
Conclude by inversion.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
Our system provides a meaningful explanation of the admissible rules in terms of normalization of nat-
ural deduction proofs. In addition, by simply lifting the condition of having closed proofs on the main
premise, we can study intermediate logics characterized by the axioms corresponding to some admissible
rules; the study of the Kreisel-Putnam logic exemplifies this approach.
16 Admissible Tools in Intuitionistic Logic
We believe that our presentation is well-suited to continue the study of admissibility in intuitionistic
systems, a subject that is currently mostly explored with semantic tools. We devised powerful proofs
of normalization for our systems KP and V, and we will try to extend these results to other similarly
obtained systems. We conclude with some remarks on future generalizations.
4.1 The Logic AD
Now that we have shown the potential of our system in analysing the extension of IPC with axioms
corresponding to admissible rules, we might wonder what could happen when we try to add several of
them. We can be even more ambitious: what if we want to add all the Visser rules to IPC? A theorem
by Rozie`re greatly simplifies our task:
Theorem 4.1 (Rozie`re [9]). All Visser rules are derivable in the logic AD, obtained by adding the V1
axiom schema to IPC.
Clearly, since the Visser rules are derivable in AD they are also admissible; as we know from Theo-
rem 1.1 this means that they form a basis for all the admissible rules of AD, and since they are derivable
we obtain:
Corollary 4.1. The logic AD is structurally complete.
However, we also know from Iemhoff [5] that IPC is the only logic that has the Visser rules as
admissible rules and satisfies the disjunction property. This means that AD cannot satisfy the disjunction
property. This was also proved with different techniques by Rozie`re, who also showed that AD is still
weaker than CPC. Given these properties, AD seems the best candidate to be studied with our technique.
4.2 Arithmetic
Since its inception with Harrop [4], the motivation for studying admissible rules of IPC was to under-
stand arithmetical systems. A famous theorem of de Jongh states that the propositional formulas whose
arithmetical instances are provable in intuitionistic arithmetic (HA) are exactly the theorems of IPC, and
many studies of the admissible rules of HA (like Visser [11], Iemhoff and Artemov [1]) originated from
it. In particular Visser shows that the propositional admissible rules of HA coincide with those of IPC,
and that Σ01 rules are also related.
Harrop’s principle, that we have investigated in this paper, is also known as the propositional Inde-
pendence of Premise principle. Its first order version:
(¬A→∃x.B(x))→∃x.(¬A→ B(x)) (IP)
corresponds to an admissible rule of HA that has an important status in the theory of arithmetic, and was
given a constructive interpretation for example by Go¨del [3] with his well known Dialectica interpreta-
tion.
We can assign to IP a proof term and two reduction rules that act in the same way as the ones
introduced for Harrop’s rule: that is, we will distinguish the two cases where there is an explicit proof of
the existential in the antecedent, and where an exfalso reasoning has been carried on. We believe that a
more advanced study of other admissible rules of HA can be carried on similar grounds.
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A Theorems on V
First some definitions. We denote with `V the provability in V (but we use ` when not ambiguous). We
denote with Γ→ an implicative typing context, i.e. of the form Γ→ = {x1 : A1→ B1, . . . ,xn : An→ Bn}.
We say that a term is→neutral if it has the form W 〈xs〉 or W 〈efq s〉.
Lemma A.1 (Classification for V). Let Γ→ `V t : A for t in normal form, and t not→neutral:
• Implication: if A = B→C, then t is either an abstraction or a variable in Γ→;
• Disjunction: if A = B∨C, then t is an injection;
• Conjunction: if A = B∧C, then t is a pair;
Proof. By induction on the type derivation of t:
• (ax) t is a variable in Γ→. By definition of Γ→, the type of t is an implication, and we conclude.
• (→I) t is an abstraction, and we conclude.
• (→E) and t = su with Γ→ ` s : B→C. Because t is in normal form, s cannot be an abstraction. By
i.h., s is either a variable in Γ→ or is→neutral; in both cases t is→neutral.
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• (∨I) t is an injection, and we conclude.
• (∨E) and t = case[s ||− |−] with Γ→ ` s : D∨D′. Because t is in normal form, s cannot be an
injection. By i.h. s is→neutral, and therefore t is→neutral.
• (∧I) t is a pair, and we conclude.
• (∧E) and t = proji s with Γ→ ` s : D∧D′. Because t is in normal form, s cannot be a pair. By i.h.
s is→neutral, and therefore t is→neutral.
• (Vissern) not possible. Assume t = Vn[~x.s ||− |− ||−] with ~x : (Ai → Bi)i=1...n ` s : A1 ∨A2
by inversion, and derive a contradiction. By i.h. s is →neutral or an injection, but both cases
contradict the hypothesis that t is a normal form.
In order to prove normalization, we define an evaluation function eval(·), mapping each typable term
in V to its normal form. We first assume a corresponding function for IPC:
Definition A.1 (evalIPC(·)). We call evalIPC(·) the function mapping each term typable in IPC to its
normal form.
Definition A.2 (eval(·)). Let t a term typable in V. We define its evaluation eval(t) by structural induc-
tion:
eval(x) := x
eval(t s) := evalIPC(eval(t) eval(s))
eval(λx. t) := λx. eval(t)
eval(efq t) := efq (eval(t))
eval(〈t,s〉) := 〈eval(t),eval(s)〉
eval(proji t) := evalIPC(proji (eval(t)))
eval(inji t) := evalIPC(inji (eval(t)))
eval(case[t || y.s1 | y.s2]) := evalIPC(case[eval(t) || y.eval(s1) | y.eval(s2)])
eval(Vn[~x.t || y.s1 | y.s2 || z.~u]) :=

evalIPC(eval(si){λ~x. t ′/y}) if eval(t) = inji t ′
evalIPC(eval(s1){λ~x.efq t ′/y}) if eval(t) =W 〈efq t ′〉
evalIPC(eval(u j){λ~x. t ′/z}) if eval(t) =W 〈x j t ′〉
Note: the three cases in the definition of eval(·) on Visser terms are exhaustive by inspection of the
normal forms of type disjunction (Lemma A.1) since it holds by inversion that Γ→ ` t : A1 ∨A2 with
dom(Γ→) =~x.
Lemma A.2 (eval(·) well-defined). For every V-term t s.t. Γ `V t : A:
1. Γ `IPC eval(t) : A,
2. eval(t) is normal,
3. t→∗V eval(t).
Proof. The three points can be proved mutually, by induction on the type derivation Γ `V t : A:
1. follows by i.h. and by subject reduction for IPC;
2. follows by i.h. and from the fact that the output of evalIPC(·) are only normal forms;
3. follows by i.h. and from the fact that IPC is a subcalculus of V.
It easily follows:
Theorem A.1 (Normalization for V). V enjoys the normalization property.
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B Theorems on KP
Theorem B.1 (Subject reduction for KP). If Γ `KP t : A and t→KP s, then Γ `KP s : A.
Proof. By the definition of reduction as the closure of 7→KP under evaluation contexts, we just prove the
statement when t 7→KP s; the general case t→KP s follows because substitution preserves types.
The cases of the usual intuitionistic reductions are standard (see for example [10]); we just prove the
cases of the reduction rules associated with hop.
For the case of the left injection hop[x.inj1 t || y.s1 | y.s2] 7→ s1{λx. t/y}, by inversion we have
Γ,y : ¬B→ A1 ` s1 : D and Γ,x : ¬B ` inj1 t : A1∨A2 for some A1,A2,B,D. Again by inversion
Γ,x : ¬B ` x : A1, and by→I we obtain Γ ` λx. t : ¬B→ A1. By substitutivity we get the desired result
Γ ` s1{λx. t/y} : D. The case of the right injection is analogous.
Finally, if hop[x.W 〈efq t〉 || y.s1 | y.s2] 7→ s1{λx.efq t/y}, by inversion we have Γ,y : ¬B→
A1 ` s1 : D and Γ,x : ¬B `W 〈efq t〉 : A1 ∨A2 for some A1,A2,B,D. It is easy to see, by induction on
the definition of weak head contexts and by inversion, that Γ,x : ¬B ` t : ⊥; by ⊥E we obtain Γ,x : ¬B `
efq t : A1. By →I we obtain Γ ` λx.efq t : ¬B→ A1, and by substitutivity we get the desired result
Γ ` s1{λx.efq t/y} : D.
We say that a term is ¬neutral if it has the form W 〈efq t〉.
Lemma B.1 (Classification for KP). Let Γ¬ `KP t : A for t in (weak head) normal form and t not
¬neutral:
• Implication: if A = B→C, then t is an abstraction or a variable in Γ¬;
• Disjunction: if A = B∨C, then t is an injection;
• Conjunction: if A = B∧C, then t is a pair;
• Falsity: if A =⊥, then t = xs for some s and some x ∈ Γ¬.
Proof. By induction on the type derivation of t:
• (ax) and t is a variable in Γ¬: by definition of Γ¬, the type of t is an implication, and we conclude.
• (→I) and t is an abstraction: trivial.
• (→E) and t = su with Γ¬ ` s : B→ A. Because t is in normal form, s cannot be an abstraction. By
i.h., s is either a variable in Γ¬ or a ¬neutral term. In the first case, note that we have that A = ⊥
and t = xs, and the thesis holds; in the second case, t is ¬neutral and the thesis holds.
• (∨I) and t is an injection: trivial.
• (∨E) and t = case[s ||− |−] with Γ¬ ` s : D1∨D2. By i.h. s is either an injection or ¬neutral.
The first case is not possible because t is in normal form; in the second case, t is ¬neutral as
required.
• (∧I) and t is a pair: trivial.
• (∧E) and t = proji s with Γ¬ ` s : D1∧D2. By i.h. s is either a pair or ¬neutral, but the first case
contradicts the hypothesis that t is in normal form. Therefore s is ¬neutral, and also t is ¬neutral.
• (⊥E) then t is immediately ¬neutral.
• (Harrop) not possible. Assume t = hop[x.s ||− |−] with Γ¬,x : ¬B ` s : D1∨D2, and derive a
contradiction. By i.h. s is an injection or a ¬neutral term, but both cases contradict the hypothesis
that t is in normal form.
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B.1 Strong Normalization
In this section, we prove the strong normalization property for KP by means of an adapted version of
Girard’s method of candidates [2].
Definition B.1 (Weak head KP contexts).
K ::= | K s | proji K | case[K || y.s1 | y.s2] | hop[x.K || y.s1 | y.s2]
Let SN be the set of strongly normalizing terms of KP. By abuse of notation, we say that a context
– be it an IPC context W or a KP context K – is strongly normalizing if all its “internal” λ -terms are
strongly normalizing.
Definition B.2 (Weak head reduction→SN,SN). We define→SN as the “strongly normalizing” closure
of 7→KP (Figure 2) under weak head contexts:
K〈(λx. t)s〉 →SN K〈t{s/x}〉
K〈proji<s1,s2>〉 →SN K〈si〉
K〈case[inji t || y.s1 | y.s2]〉 →SN K〈si{t/y}〉
K〈hop[x.inji t || y.s1 | y.s2]〉 →SN K〈si{λx. t/y}〉
K〈hop[x.W 〈efq t〉 || y.s1 | y.s2]〉 →SN K〈s1{(λx.efq t)/y}〉
for every SN contexts W,K and t,s,s1,s2 ∈ SN. As usual, we denote by→∗SN the reflexive and transitive
closure of →SN. A term t is a →SN-normal form (in short, →SNnf) if t 6→SN. We say that t SN s if
t→∗SN s and s is a→SNnf.
By inspection of the reduction rules, one may prove:
Lemma B.2. →SN is deterministic.
One of the main properties of reducibility candidates is that they are backward closed under reduc-
tion:
Definition B.3 (Backward closure←−· ). Let T be a set of→SNnfs. We define its closure under backward
weak head reduction as the set
←−
T := {s | sSN t ∈ T}.
Lemma B.3 (Backward closure of SN). SN is backward closed under→SN.
Proof. Let t ∈ SN and s→SN t; we need show that s ∈ SN. By cases on the reduction rules of Defi-
nition B.2; we only consider the case of Harrop-inj, as one can proceed in a similar way for the other
reduction rules. Let s= K〈hop[x.inji t ′ || y.s′1 | y.s′2]〉→SN K〈s′i{λx. t ′/y}〉= t, and let us consider a
reduction sequence beginning with s. Either the sequence terminates after some internal redutions
s→∗ K′〈hop[x.inji t ′′ || y.s′′1 | y.s′′2]〉
which must terminate because all internal terms are SN by definition of→SN, or eventually we have
K′〈hop[x.inji t ′′ || y.s′′1 | y.s′′2]〉 → K′〈s′′i {λx. t ′′/y}〉.
This term is strongly normalizing because it is a reduct of t, and by hypothesis t ∈ SN. Therefore the
reduction sequence must terminate.
Another key notion are neutral terms, that are intuitively→SNnfs that do not begin with constructors:
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Definition B.4 (Neutral terms). Ne := {K〈x〉 |K is SN and x a variable}∪{W 〈efq t〉 |W and t are SN}.
Fact B.1. Neutral terms are strongly normalizing→SNnfs.
We are now ready to define the semantics of formulas:
Definition B.5 (Denotation J·K).
1. JpK := SN for every p atomic (also p =⊥),
2. JA→ BK :=←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−{λx. t | ∀s ∈ JAK, t{s/x} ∈ JBK}∪←−Ne,
3. JA1∧A2K :=←−−−−−−−−−−−−−{< t1, t2> | ti ∈ JAiK}∪←−Ne,
4. JA1∨A2K :=←−−−−−−−−−−−{inji t | t ∈ JAiK}∪←−Ne.
In fact, we note that our definition produces candidates of reducibility:
Lemma B.4 (Denotations are candidates). For every A, its denotation:
1. contains only strongly normalizing terms: JAK⊆ SN
2. contains all neutral terms: Ne⊆ JAK
3. is backward closed: if t ∈ JAK and s→SN t, then s ∈ JAK.
Proof. Points 2 and 3 are trivial. Before proving Point 1 we note that as shown in the proof of Lemma B.3,
if T contains only strongly normalizing terms, then
←−
T does too. We can then prove Point 1 by induction
on the structure of types: the case of propositional atoms follows from Definition B.5(1) and Lemma B.3;
for the inductive cases, use Fact B.1, the i.h. and Lemma B.3.
We extend the definition of valuation to typing contexts:
Definition B.6. Let Γ be a typing context; we define JΓK as the set of substitutions mapping variables in
Γ to terms in the denotation of the corresponding type, i.e.
JΓK := {σ substitution | dom(σ) = dom(Γ) and (x 7→ t) ∈ σ implies t ∈ JΓ(x)K}
where Γ(x) := A when (x : A) ∈ Γ.
A lemma useful in the proof of Lemma B.6:
Lemma B.5. If t→SN s and tσ ∈ SN, then tσ →SN sσ .
Proof. First note that if t = K〈t ′〉 and tσ ∈ SN, then tσ = K′〈t ′σ〉 for some SN context K′. Therefore,
we assume that K〈t ′〉 →SN K〈s′〉 with t ′ 7→ s′, and we prove that t ′σ 7→ s′σ by cases on the reduction
rules:
• (λy.s)u 7→ s{u/y}. By renaming, y 6∈ fv(σ),dom(σ). Then ((λy.s)u)σ = (λy.sσ)(uσ) 7→
sσ{uσ/y}, with s{u/y}σ = s{u/y}σ . We conclude because sσ{uσ/y}= s{u/y}σ and sσ ,uσ ∈
SN by the hypothesis that tσ ∈ SN.
• proji< t1, t2> 7→ ti. Then (proji< t1, t2>)σ = proji< t1σ, t2σ> 7→ tiσ , and t1σ , t2σ ∈ SN by
hypothesis.
• case[inji t || y.s1 | y.s2] 7→ si{t/y}. By renaming, y 6∈ fv(σ),dom(σ). Similar to the case
below.
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• hop[x.inji t || y.s1 | y.s2] 7→ si{λx. t/y}. By renaming, x,y 6∈ fv(σ),dom(σ).
Then hop[x.inji t || y.s1 | y.s2]σ = hop[x.inji (tσ) || y.s1σ | y.s2σ] 7→ siσ{λx. tσ/y}. We
conclude because siσ{λx. tσ/y}= (si{λx. t/y})σ .
• hop[x.W 〈efq t〉 || y.s1 | y.s2] 7→ s1{λx.efq t/y}. By renaming, x,y 6∈ fv(σ),dom(σ).
Then hop[x.W 〈efq t〉 || y.s1 | y.s2]σ = hop[x.W ′〈efq tσ〉 || y.s1σ | y.s2σ] for some SN con-
text W ′. We have hop[x.W ′〈efq tσ〉 || y.s1σ | y.s2σ] 7→ s1σ{λx.efq (tσ)/y}, and we con-
clude because s1σ{λx.efq (tσ)/y}= s1{λx.efq t/y}σ .
Lemma B.6 (Fundamental lemma). If Γ ` t : A and σ ∈ JΓK, then tσ ∈ JAK.
Proof. By induction on the type derivation. The base case is the axiom, and instantiated variables belong
to the corresponding denotations by the definition of JΓK. Let us now proceed by cases on the rules of
inference:
(→I) Assume that for all σ ∈ JΓ,x : AK, tσ ∈ JBK; we need to prove that for all σ ∈ JΓK, (λx. t)σ ∈JA→ BK. Let σ ∈ JΓK, and by renaming x 6∈ dom(σ)∪ fv(σ). Then (λx. t)σ = λx. tσ . By Defini-
tion B.5(2), λx. tσ ∈ JA→ BK iff for all s ∈ JAK, tσ{s/x} ∈ JBK. By taking σ ′ := σ ∪{s/x}, this
follows from the i.h. and from the hypothesis on σ .
(→E) We need to prove that for all σ ∈ JΓK, (t s)σ ∈ JBK. Note that (t s)σ = (tσ)(sσ). By i.h. tσ ∈JA→ BK, and therefore by Definition B.5(2), either:
– tσ SN n ∈ Ne: then (tσ)(sσ)→∗SN n(sσ) since sσ ∈ SN (by i.h. and Lemma B.4(1)) Note
that n(sσ) is neutral, and we conclude by Lemma B.4(2) and Lemma B.4(3).
– tσ SN λy.u: then (tσ)(sσ)→∗SN (λy.u)(sσ)→SN u{sσ/y} ∈ JBK by Definition B.5(2).
Conclude by Lemma B.4(3).
(⊥I) By the hypothesis, for every σ ∈ JΓK, tσ ∈ J⊥K. We need to prove that (efq t)σ ∈ JAK. By
Lemma B.4(1) tσ ∈ SN, and since (efq t)σ = efq (tσ), (efq t)σ is a neutral term. Conclude by
Lemma B.4(2).
(∧I) Let Γ ` t1 : A1 and Γ ` t2 : A2: we need to prove that for every σ ∈ JΓK, < t1, t2>σ ∈ JA1∧A2K.
Since < t,s>σ = < tσ,sσ>, the claim follows from Definition B.5(3) and the i.h. tσ ∈ JAK and
sσ ∈ JBK.
(∧E) Let Γ ` s : A1 ∧ A2, and by i.h. sσ ∈ JA1∧A2K for every σ ∈ JΓK. We need to prove that
(proj1 s)σ ∈ JA1K and (proj2 s)σ ∈ JA2K for every σ ∈ JΓK. There are two cases:
– sσ SN n ∈ Ne: then proji (sσ) SN proji n and we conclude by Lemma B.4(2) and
Lemma B.4(3) because that term is neutral.
– uσ SN < t1, t2> for some t1 ∈ JA1K and t2 ∈ JA2K: therefore proji (uσ)→∗SN proji< t1, t2>
→SN ti ∈ JAiK. Conclude by Lemma B.4(3) since (proji u)σ = proji (uσ).
(∨I) We discuss the case of inj1 ; the case of inj2 is symmetric. Let Γ ` t : A, and by i.h. tσ ∈ JAK for
every σ ∈ JΓK. We show that also (inj1 t)σ ∈ JA∨BK for every σ ∈ JΓK. Note that (inj1 t)σ =
inj1 (tσ), and conclude by i.h. and Definition B.5(4).
(∨E) This case is just a simplified version of the following argument for the Harrop rule.
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(Harrop) We need to prove that (hop[x.t || y.s1 | y.s2])σ ∈ JDK for every σ ∈ JΓK. We first note that
(hop[x.t || y.s1 | y.s2])σ = hop[x.tσ || y.s1σ | y.s2σ] (assuming by renaming that x and y
do not occur in σ ). Let σ ′ := σ ∪{x/x}. tσ = tσ ′ and by i.h. tσ ′ ∈ JA1∨A2K. There are three
cases:
– tσ ′SN inji ui for ui ∈ JAiK: then also hop[x.tσ || y.s1σ | y.s2σ]→∗SN siσ{λx.ui/y}. In
order to be able to use the i.h. we need to show that σ∪{λx.ui/y}∈ JΓ,y : ¬B→ AiK, i.e. that
λx.ui ∈ J¬B→ AiK, that by definition holds iff for every t ′ ∈ J¬BK, ui{t ′/x} ∈ JAiK. In order
to show the latter, take σ ′′ := σ ∪{t ′/x}: then by i.h. tσ ′′ ∈ JA1∨A2K ⊆ SN, and therefore
by Lemma B.5 tσ ′′ = tσ ′{t ′/x} →∗SN inji (ui{t ′/x})SN inji u′i for ui{t ′/x}SN u′i. By
Definition B.5(4) u′i ∈ JAiK, but also ui{t ′/x} by Lemma B.4(3), and we conclude.
– tσ ′ SN W 〈efq u〉 ∈ Ne: then also hop[x.tσ || y.s1σ | y.s2σ]→∗SN s1σ{λx.efq u/y}.
As above, in order to use the i.h. and conclude we only need to prove that (λx.efq u) ∈J¬B→ A1K. By Definition B.5(2), this is the case if and only if for all u′ ∈ J¬BK,
(efq u){u′/x} ∈ JA1K. This is proved similarly as the point above, and it follows by
Lemma B.5 and the definition of inert terms.
– tσ ′SN K〈z〉 ∈Ne: we conclude as usual because hop[x.K〈z〉 || y.s1σ | y.s2σ] is neutral
as well.
Theorem B.2 (Strong normalization of KP). If Γ `KP t : A, then t is strongly normalizing.
Proof. By Lemma B.6, tσ ∈ JAK for every σ ∈ JΓK. We now take σ as the identity substitution, mapping
the variables in Γ to themselves. Note that this is an allowed substitution since variables are neutral
terms and therefore are contained in the denotation of every proposition (Lemma B.4(2)). It follows that
t = tσ ∈ JAK, and we conclude because JAK contains only SN terms by Lemma B.4(1).
